Privacy you can inspect.

A · Threat model

What EVPN is designed against

• Hostile public Wi-Fi
• Local network observers
• Routine ISP visibility into destination traffic
• DNS leakage
• Accidental traffic leakage when VPN protection is enabled

B · What EVPN protects

Protected path, by design

• Traffic between device and VPN gateway
• DNS requests inside the VPN
• Originating public IP from normal destination websites
• IPv4/IPv6 routing leakage where supported
• Traffic during VPN interruption when kill switch is enabled

C · Limits

What a VPN cannot guarantee

Transparency matters more than slogans. EVPN cannot guarantee:

• Anonymity against a global passive adversary
• Anonymity after users sign into identifiable accounts
• Protection from malware already installed on a device
• Prevention of browser fingerprinting
• Secrecy for plaintext HTTP after traffic leaves the VPN exit
• Universal streaming access
• Universal censorship resistance
• Immunity from lawful infrastructure seizure

D · Architecture separation

Who should not know where traffic goes

The system that serves a promotion should not be able to reach the system that carries your traffic.

E · Logging policy

Collect less on the data plane

This is policy and architecture language. It is not a claim that infrastructure has already been independently audited.

F · Audit / transparency

Current state

NOT YET AUDITED

Target transparency work includes external application review, infrastructure/no-logging audit, published remediation and a clear vulnerability-reporting path. Dates and providers will be named when engagements are real — not before.

G · Research

Future work, clearly labelled